• The fight within the House Democratic Caucus over the upcoming Iraq supplemental appropriations bill has broken down generally along Blue Dog/Progressive Caucus lines. Caught in the divide is the so-called Murtha Plan — a mechanism that reportedly used the Congressional “power of the purse” to prohibit the use of appropriated funds for the deployment of troops who were not adequately trained, rested, armored, and combat ready. Additional differences have arisen over the use of the same “power of the purse” to give teeth to the so-called “benchmarks” for progress the president would be required to meet in order to continue to prosecute his war in Iraq.

  Now, the bill’s not public yet, but I’m told that the language most at issue reads like this:

  Funds appropriated or otherwise made available in this or any other Act may not be obligated or expended to deploy or continue to deploy members or units of the Armed Forces in Iraq after the conclusion of the 180 day period for redeployment specified in subsections (c) and (d).

  What are subsections (c) and (d) about? I’m informed that they’re apparently the ones that lay out the so-called “benchmarks,” which means this language — since removed from the bill at the behest of the Blue Dogs — was the mechanism for enforcing those benchmarks.

  At the moment, it appears that the political calculus hinges on what happens with those “teeth.” That is, the leadership’s math goes like this: they figure they get and keep more Blue Dog votes by removing the ability to enforce the benchmarks than they lose from the Progressive Caucus, who think the president can’t be trusted and will game the benchmarks and continue to humiliate and embarrass Congressional Democrats.

  So as things stand now, the language is out, because by the leadership’s count, there were more Blue Dogs at least implicitly threatening to vote against a bill that included it than there were Progressive Caucus members threatening to vote against a bill that excluded it.

  Fair enough, from a purely political perspective.

  But it begs the question: How serious were the Blue Dogs about that? And how would you find out?

  With the enforcement language out of the bill, enough Blue Dogs have apparently signaled their consent so that it has a chance to pass, even over the objections of some number of Progressive Caucus members. It’s a much more comfortable vote for the Blue Dogs now, though a much more uncomfortable vote for progressives, who view it as a matter of principle that the legislation take what concrete steps are possible to end the war. The flip side, of course, is that many Blue Dogs assert that it is a matter of principle for them that the Congress not “tie the president’s hands” in conducting military operations.

  But as we can see, procedure has intervened to give the advantage to the Blue Dogs. As the bill stands now, the enforcement mechanism cited above is out, though the Progressive Caucus may or may not be permitted to offer an amendment to put it (and other language aimed at forcing withdrawal) back in. The onus, then, is on the Progressive Caucus to either stand on principle and cast the tough vote that threatens to send the message that Democrats are divided by voting against a bill that’s toothless, or to subsume that principle in order to give the Democrats a “win.”

  Will they choose to be “good Democrats” first, and principled progressives second? Is that even a fair description of the choice they’re being given? Nobody can say for sure.

  But what if the procedural decision had broken the other way? What if the enforcement mechanism had been left in, and the Blue Dogs had been offered the opportunity to bring an amendment to the floor to eliminate it? What do we think the outcome would have been in that case?

  Then the game would have been very different. The onus would have been on the Blue Dogs to either stand on principle (here, that the president’s hands not be “tied”) and cast the tough vote that threatens to send the message that Democrats are divided by voting to remove the bill’s teeth, or to subsume that principle in order to give Democrats a “win.”

  Do we see a quantum difference between the principles at stake in these two hypothetical votes? Do we see a difference in the likelihood that, put on the spot, the Blue Dogs or Progressives would be forced to buckle and cast the uncomfortable vote? Progressives, if they get to offer an amendment, would be asking to change the status quo to put teeth in. I see that as a vote more of them are likely to stick to their guns on. Blue Dogs, if the roles were reversed, would be taking the floor to ask that the teeth be taken out. I’m not nearly as sure that they’d really show up in numbers to do that.

  But as things stand now, the pressure is on the Progressives and enforcement, as opposed to being on the Blue Dogs and benchmarks.

  Are there other enforcement mechanisms in the bill? Maybe. Nobody’s seen them yet. But I find it very telling that the provisions I’ve learned have been removed — as well as who insisted they be removed — has set up a vote that will require amending on the floor in order to change the status quo with respect to the power of the president vis-a-vis the Congress, rather than forcing those who prefer the status quo to amend the bill in order to freeze it in place.

  Which do you think would have won?

  

  
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• Just so you know:

  Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice urged the Democratic-controlled Congress not to interfere in the conduct of the Iraq war today and suggested President George W. Bush would defy troop withdrawal legislation.

  Many of you likely know this already from having watched the Sunday shows. And many of you knew it even without hearing it again today.

  Of course, Democrats pushed back to some extent, too:

  But Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said lawmakers would step up efforts to force Bush to change course. “The president needs a check and a balance,” said Levin, D-Mich.

  I agree. He needs a check and balance. And while I applaud Levin’s efforts, I do so only because I know they kick the can further down the road we all know we’re bound to travel here. Senator Levin says the president needs a check and balance, but I don’t think he’s hearing Secretary Rice. The president will defy your legislation.

  The president will defy your legislation.

  Now, that doesn’t mean this isn’t something Levin and his colleagues aren’t going to want to see for themselves. But time’s a-wastin’. Let’s get this show on the road, already. We know what’s going to happen, and we know what your choices are going to be at the end of the road: roll over, or impeach.

  How do we know? Well, Rice says so. On what basis? Well, to the extent that she needs a basis for a statement like that, she’s probably pointing to the fact that this “administration” believes Congress is literally powerless to stop the war.

  Levin and his colleagues propose to repeal the 2002 AUMF, replacing it with a resolution that would restrict the use of American forces in Iraq and eventually force a withdrawal. On what grounds does the president plan to defy this? Well, he’s got a multilayered strategy available to him. For one thing, he could opt to fall back on the 2001 AUMF — the one originally passed to authorize the use of force in Afghanistan — by claiming (as he’s already done on numerous occasions) that Iraq is part of the greater war on terror, and that since al Qaeda is (now) operating in Iraq, the 2001 AUMF authorizes our continued presence there.

  But couldn’t we then amend the 2001 AUMF? Sure, assuming you could get the votes for it. But dig this: Bush doesn’t think he needs the 2001 AUMF either. John Yoo tells us why:

  In both the War Powers Resolution and the Joint Resolution [the AUMF], Congress has recognized the President’s authority to use force in circumstances such as those created by the September 11 incidents.

  Recognized. Not granted.

  Neither statute, however, can place any limits on the President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the response. These decisions, under our Constitution, are for the President alone to make.

  If this strikes you as familiar, it may be because I’ve shown it to you before.

  And the same conclusion holds now as held then:

  Yoo’s theories having reduced Congress to a cipher, from the White House point of view, it hardly makes a difference how they opt to wait out the last two years of Bush’s term.

  If they’d like to spend it methodically demonstrating Yoo’s point for the American public, that option is open to them, and the path runs through Congressional “oversight,” subpoenas, repeal of the AUMF and all the other goodies that have been dangled before us as “alternatives” to impeachment.

  Again, I applaud the effort to the extent that it hastens the inevitable, but I told you a month ago (and, for the record, several times before that) what Bush’s response to this — and everything else in the Democratic arsenal — was going to be, and it’ll be another month before Levin even puts himself in a position to get that answer.

  Yes, I know impeachment is “off the table.” But we’ll cross paths with it soon enough, since Bush keeps pulling our chairs out from under us.

  

  
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